










































The biology of identity
Citation for published version:
Sturdy, S 2010, 'The biology of identity' The Philosophers’ Magazine, vol. 48, pp. 53-58.
Link:






© Sturdy, S. (2010). The biology of identity. The Philosophers’ Magazine, 48, 53-58.
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
Genomics and personal identity -- draft article for The Philosopher’s Magazine 
 
Steve Sturdy 
Deputy Director, ESRC Genomics Policy and Research Forum, The University of Edinburgh 
 
 
Recent developments in the science of genomics have had important implications for how we think about 
personal identity.  One effect has been to underwrite our sense of individual uniqueness.  With the 
exception of identical twins, we all possess unique genomes.  Practically, this fact has been exploited 
through the development of new technologies of identification -- most notably for forensic purposes -- 
that in effect instrumentalise the idea that personal identity is rooted in biological individuality.  More 
generally, the hype surrounding the identification of growing numbers of genes that supposedly 
predispose to a diversity of biological traits -- everything from disease susceptibility to temperament to 
sexual orientation -- has fostered a climate in which it is increasingly easy to suppose that our genomes 
embody our unique destinies: we are our genomes, and our genomes are us.   
 
But personal identity involves more than just a sense of individual uniqueness.  It is also heavily 
bound up with our shared membership of different social groups: nationality, ethnicity, kinship, class, 
occupation, political affiliation, star sign and many other social categories may all loom large in the ways 
we think about identity.  Such collective identities are as much a part of social life as individuality.  They 
constitute the warp and weft of the variegated social tapestries through which we thread our individual 
lives, and from which we construct our individual biographies.  They serve both to bind and to divide 
society.  And if we look at how new genomic technologies are being employed to define who we are, 
their impact has overwhelmingly been on how we identify ourselves as members of particular social 
groups.   
 
Race and ethnicity is an obvious example.  Study of the genetics of human populations makes 
clear that the subdivision of the human species into distinct races on grounds of skin colour and other 
conventional markers of race is unsupported by any underlying genetic or evolutionary basis; there is 
simply too little genetic difference between these supposedly different racial populations, and too much 
genetic traffic between them, for them to be considered distinct in any biologically meaningful sense.  
Racial distinctions may be a social reality, but they are not rooted in biological reality.  Nonetheless, 
genomic technologies are widely employed in ways that tend to reify racial and ethnic divisions.  The 
International HapMap Project, for instance, is a multi-country scientific collaboration that ostensibly sets 
out to catalogue the global diversity of human genetics.  But the project has chosen to concentrate on 
characterising four relatively discrete population groups -- Han Chinese from Beijing; Tokyo Japanese; 
Yoruba people from Ibadan, Nigeria; and Utah-resident Americans with northern and western European 
ancestry -- that effectively reproduce conventional racial categories.  Findings from this and other work 
on global genetic variation in turn feed back into how race and ethnicity are perceived as social 
categories.  Bundles of genes identified with particular geographical localities are commonly re-described 
in racial terms, for instance when used to identify populations at risk of certain diseases or to generate 
suspect profiles from forensic DNA evidence.   
 
This tendency to essentialise racial and ethnic categories in genetic terms is not confined to 
scientific and other official agencies.  Some ethnic groups actively collude in such processes, particularly 
where confirmation of ethnic identity may confer certain social or other advantages.  Sections of the 
Jewish diaspora, for instance, have embraced evidence of a shared genomic inheritance as a means of 
consolidating their collective identity and reinforcing their claims to have historic roots in present-day 
Israel.  But such evidence has also created opportunities for other groups to claim Jewish identity.  The 
Lemba, a dark-skinned Southern African people, have long professed to be descended from a common 
Jewish ancestor.  Genomic investigations have recently shown that a significant number among the 
Lemba’s hereditary male priesthood possess a peculiar Y chromosome haplotype that is also prevalent 
among Jewish Cohens -- a finding that lends considerable credence to what was previously regarded as a 
mere oral tradition of dubious provenance.  Such findings potentially extend Jewish identity to ethnic 
groups well beyond those that have historically been regarded as genuine Jews, with possible political 
consequences should such groups go on to claim Israeli residency or citizenship.  These kinds of 
examples can be multiplied.  In the United States, genomic evidence of Native American descent is 
increasingly being used to adjudicate claims to be interred in ancient burial grounds, to open casinos, or to 
practise as “native” artists.  Meanwhile, private companies are cashing in the boom in “recreational 
genealogy” by offering DNA tests that purport to yield evidence of geographical and ethnic origins.  
Claims about ethnic identity are thus coming increasingly to rest, not solely on social criteria, but on 
evidence produced by new genomic technologies.   
 
Questions of descent and relatedness embrace not only issues of ethnicity, but also of family and 
kinship.  Here too, genomic technologies and genetic perspectives are subtly influencing how we define 
identity.  As anthropologists have long appreciated, kinship is one of the fundamental frameworks around 
which human societies are organised.  The ways in which kinship and relatedness are assigned vary 
enormously across different societies, and only rarely map in any simple way onto patterns of genetic 
relatedness.  But the rapid growth and implementation of genomic technologies is doing much to 
consolidate the idea that genetic relatedness represents a particularly “true” form of kinship.  For instance, 
genomic techniques have been recruited to reinforce long-standing conventions of patrilineal inheritance, 
both through the widespread adoption of paternity tests to determine who should bear financial 
responsibility for children, and through high-profile cases such as the demonstration that some male 
descendants of Thomas Jefferson’s slave Sally Hemings carried a Y chromosome inherited from the 
Jefferson line, and most likely from Jefferson himself.  The use of mitochondrial DNA to demonstrate 
descent through the female line is notably less common, though both Y chromosome and mitochondrial 
DNA haplotyping -- the identification of particular patterns of mutations shared between relatively large 
populations of individuals who are not directly related to one another -- are commonly used to identify the 
likely geographical or ethnic origins of distant ancestors.   
 
But privileging such practices to determine parentage and descent also tends to devalue other 
forms of kinship, including non-biological relationships such as adoption.  This is apparent in the 
language surrounding recent moves to give adopted children, and those born as a result of donor-assisted 
conception, the right to know the identity of their genetic parents.  Talk of genetic parentage routinely 
slips into talk about “true”, “real” or “natural” parents, while pro-life campaigner David Alton goes so far 
as to equate genetic inheritance with “identity” pure and simple.  By such language, the social aspects of 
parenting are sidelined or even written out altogether.  Yet this is to exclude what many would consider a 
vitally important dimension of kinship.  This is particularly apparent in the way that different populations 
have responded to the introduction of DNA tests as a means of proving kinship for immigration purposes.  
The adoption of such tests by the British immigration services has been largely uncontroversial.  The 
majority of British immigrants come from the Indian subcontinent, where kinship patterns tend to follow 
lines of biological relatedness; consequently, for Indian and Pakistani immigrants wishing to bring their 
families into Britain, DNA testing actually provides a welcome opportunity to demonstrate biological 
relatedness in the face of official suspicion.  The situation in France is very different.  Many of those 
seeking entry into France come from African countries where ideas of parentage do not necessarily imply 
strict biological progeniture.  Moreover, many come from countries disrupted by war or famine.  Under 
such circumstances, orphaned children are commonly adopted by relatives or friends -- though the 
disruption of civil bureaucracies often means that such adoptions are not officially documented.  Such 
families routinely fail the test of biological relatedness imposed by the French immigration authorities, 
and many are broken up or refused admission.  Opposition to the use of DNA tests and the privileging of 
biological over social parentage has accordingly been bitter and sustained among French immigrant 
communities.   
 
As well as race and family, genomics also helps to underwrite the establishment of other, newer 
kinds of group identity.  In recent decades, novel identities have been created through the formation of 
social movements to further the interests of sufferers from certain disease.  Where those diseases can be 
shown to be strongly linked to the inheritance of particular genes, as in Huntingdon’s chorea, this has 
served to extend the disease identity beyond those with symptomatic disease, to include relatives and 
other carriers of the relevant genes.  Moreover, the identification of groups at risk from genetic disease is 
expanding rapidly, as medical and pharmaceutical agencies commit massive resources to identifying 
genes that predispose to an increasingly wide range of conditions.  More and more people are being 
identified as belonging to one or more genetic risk categories, with potentially profound impacts on 
everyday life in terms of lifestyle advice, medical intervention or inflated insurance premiums.   
 
Such genetic disease identities can in turn interact in unpredictable ways with other kinds of 
group identity.  The high incidence of Tay-Sachs disease among Ashkenazi Jews, for instance, has if 
anything reinforced the sense that Jewishness is a genetic as much as an ethnic identity.  Conversely, 
ethnic identity can inform perceptions of genetic risk: for instance, medical evidence that genes 
predisposing to cystic fibrosis are less common among African-Americans than in the population as a 
whole has actually tended to exacerbate under-diagnosis of the disease in African-American children, as 
doctors tend to assume that these children’s symptoms must be due to other causes.  Again, these kinds of 
interactions between disease identity and ethnic identity are likely to proliferate as pharmaceutical 
companies and other medical agencies seek new ways of tailoring prophylactic and therapeutic 
interventions ever more precisely to specific markets.  Already, a pharmaceutical preparation called 
BiDil, used for treating congestive heart failure, has been licensed in the USA for use exclusively among 
African-Americans.  In this instance, genomic evidence was not employed to define the particular 
population among whom the drug was found to be most effective, which consisted of self-identified 
African-Americans.  But the manufacturer’s success in gaining approval for a racially-targeted 
medication will almost certainly pave the way for further drug approval applications in which genomic 
criteria of both ethnicity and disease susceptibility will be deployed.  In so doing, the likelihood is that 
pharmaceutical companies and licensing agencies will further entrench the supposition that racial 
identities are primarily genetic in character, characterised not least by the diseases to which they are 
congenitally susceptible and the medications to which they are constitutionally best suited.   
 
Insofar as genomics is impacting on our sense of identity, then, it would appear that it is being 
used far more for the purpose of assigning us to particular social categories -- be they familial, racial or 
pathological -- than for bolstering our sense that we are unique individuals.  Such processes are often 
unpredictable and even contradictory; genomic redefinitions of ethnic identity, for instance, may 
problematise as well as reinforce existing categories, as we have seen in the case of Jewishness.  Equally, 
genomic measures of similarity and difference may serve to transcend as well as to inscribe the 
boundaries between social categories and even between species; the observation that we share 98% of our 
genes with chimpanzees is often invoked to emphasise our behavioural and physiological similarity to 
other primates (though less is made of the fact that we also share 35% of our genes with daffodils).  But 
on the whole, the tendency is towards finding new ways of categorising humanity into distinct genomic 
sub-groups.   
 
We should probably not be surprised by this.  At least since Darwin, ideas about biological 
inheritance and descent have been used as a means of drawing lines of similarity and difference between 
sections of the human species, as well as between humanity and the rest of the natural world.  Genomics 
is simply the latest scientific tool to be pressed into such service.  But the advent of genomics does raise 
some novel issues.  New genomic technologies provide more robust, discriminating and reproducible 
methods of assigning biological identity than anything that has previously been available; while the 
adoption of such technologies by a growing variety of social agencies -- including government and 
industry, social movements and private individuals -- is already proceeding on a massive scale.  Given the 
extent to which these technologies are becoming embedded in everyday life, it seems inevitable that they 
will come to play an increasingly important role in the way we construct our individual and collective 
identities.  The eventual outcome of this process of genomicisation remains difficult to predict; as we 
have seen, the dynamics of genomic identification are complex and often contradictory.  At present, 
however, it seems that the overwhelming tendency is towards ever more fine-grained definitions of 
kinship, ethnicity and health status.  Perhaps most importantly, the material character of these new 
technologies of genomic identification, and the fact that they are so robust and reproducible, makes them 
much harder to challenge than earlier forms of biological categorisation.  Where such technologies are 
involved, group membership becomes less a matter of individual or collective judgement, and more a 
matter of technological determination.  Increasingly, it seems, the power to determine identity -- both 
individual and collective -- is becoming invested in new genomic technologies, and in those sections of 
society who have access or control over those technologies.   
 
